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Introduction 
Catastrophes are usually associated with phenomena like tsunamis, earthquakes or asteroid 
impacts – disasters that happen rapidly with immediately visible impacts. A different logic is 
involved when problems and challenges evolve incrementally, in slow-motion, and when they 
only become visible over long periods (Pierson 2004). Jared Diamond recently referred to 
such changes as “creeping normalcy” (Diamond 2005). Changes are perceived as normality if 
they happen in unnoticed increments. This concept was used to explain the varying adaptation 
capacities of human societies to long-term environmental changes. 
A powerful metaphor illustrating the inherent dangers of such processes is the boiling-
frog allegory. Al Gore was using it in his movie “An Inconvenient Truth”. If a frog is thrown 
into a pan of boiling water, it will immediately jump out, but if you put a frog in a jar of warm 
water and gradually heat it to boiling, the frog will stay until it boils to death. The frog’s 
nervous system is apparently impervious to changes in temperature until their fatal 
consequence because it happens piecemeal-incrementally. Anthony Giddens was quick to 
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baptize this temporal dilemma as the “Gidden’s Paradox”, stating that, “since the dangers 
posed by global warming aren’t tangible, immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day-
life, however awesome they appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete 
nature about them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before stirred to serious 
action will, by definition, be too late” (Giddens 2009: 99).  
In the evolution of human societies, there are a number of processes that exhibit this 
pattern of “creepiness”. The above-mentioned climate change is just the most broadly 
discussed social and political problem of this kind. Other examples of creeping catastrophes 
are increasing social stress produced by aging societies, the slow accumulation of toxic 
chemicals in the environment and food chain, or global pandemics like SARS and AIDS 
combined with increasing antibiotics resistance. All these processes have in common that they 
evolve bit by bit, are cumulative, and possibly result in disastrous long-term consequences. 
In this paper, we are not interested in the material side of this process pattern, but 
rather in its political and social consequences. We try to determine if and how societies and 
their political systems differ in the capacity to detect such creeping problems early. We 
suppose that these differences are related to variations in their “nervous systems of 
governance”, which control perception and adaptive behavior (Ashby 1956; Deutsch 1963). 
We are interested in how this social cybernetics is generated by internal differentiation and 
integration of societal mechanisms and how these “neuronal networks” perceive, 
communicate, and act. A key question is: Do democratic political systems, where political 
power is dispersed and shared among many, perform better with the perception of creeping 
challenges, or do we find examples of effective “eco-dictatorships”? Does decentralization 
and multilevel differentiation show adaptive advantages, as it is not only claimed by recent 
management tracts (Brafman & Beckstrom 2006), but also by collective action scholars such 
as Ostrom (2010)? 
Based on a comparison of national policies related to global warming, the paper will 
discuss and then develop some hypotheses detailing how, why, and under which conditions 
differently structured policy systems show varying performance. We will first outline an 
analytical framework how political systems deal with this kind of long-term risks, and how 
differently structured systems have adaptive advantages and disadvantages. In the subsequent 
section, we will test some of these hypotheses related to the climate change topic empirically 
in a macro-quantitative model. We argue that internal structures and external factors both 
contribute to the varying pace and degree of governmental reaction. We will conclude with a 
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list of weaknesses and limits these macro-quantitative models exhibit and propose some 
complementary research strategies. 
 
Societal development and adaptation 
The issue of political adaptation to environmental changes is a rediscovery within the last 
decade. During the 1960s, it was an important concept within the developmental theory of 
political systems (Almond 1965; Parsons 1964). In the last decade, it reentered the discussion 
with respect to the adaption of political systems to significant economic and political 
transformations (Grote, Lang & Schneider 2008), and it became a particularly powerful 
concept with respect to the impact ecological transformations have on political systems 
(Folke, Hahn, Olsson & Norberg 2005).  
Traditional social theory strongly focused on the construction and maintenance of 
order. The question of how societies successfully overcome structural and behavioral changes 
in order to cope with critical problems was only raised in a few “grand theories”. One of these 
theories is Marxism, which holds the optimistic belief of a teleological sequence of changes in 
economic systems and forces of production. These are ultimately driven by social conflict, 
where the whole process leads to an increasingly powerful mastery of nature and society. The 
other approach with a similar teleological content is systems theory. It emphasizes general 
adaptive capacities and openness of social and political systems, the latter of which are based 
on increasing structural and functional differentiation (Almond 1965; Deutsch 1963; Parsons 
1964). 
A serious problem with traditional systems theory is that systems and systemic 
processes, for the most part, remain “black boxes” in which actors, relations and mechanisms 
are opaque (Bunge 1996). In this respect, we use basic ideas of governance theory to identify 
varieties of actors with different functions and institutional structures enabling 
communication, integration and long-term adaptation (for an overview see Schneider & Bauer 
2007).  
A fundamental problem from this point of view is to understand under which 
conditions societies attain complete adaptive failures, i.e. “collapse”. Historical analysis has 
demonstrated that there are many reasons for the collapse of past societies. External factors 
threatening the existence of a society are, for example: climate change, hostile neighbors, 
depletion of vital resources, natural catastrophes and a variety of economic factors (Diamond 
2005; Tainter 1988). In addition to these environmental challenges, internal societal tensions 
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such as class conflict and elite misbehavior may also lead to collapse. Since we are not 
interested in all reasons for failure but rather in socio-political ones, we concentrate on typical 
social processes that are related to societies’ perception and responses to critical problems. 
Complex societies develop differentiated political and cultural rule systems to cope 
with critical threats and problems. Why can a society fail in this respect? When we think of 
which essential parts of the problem-solving process can go wrong, we can separate the 
factors in a sequence of four phases (Diamond 2005). Some of these phases are well known in 
the “policy cycle” literature of political science (May & Wildavsky 1979). 
First, a society can anticipate a problem. But anticipation can fail for several reasons: 
a society may have no prior experience of a given problem and cannot imagine the possibility 
of its occurrence. Another cause is reasoning by false analogy (Diamond 2005). While 
analogy is a well-known technique for the solving ill-structured problems (Simon 1973), such 
constructions may be false and consequently suggest inappropriate strategies. 
At the second stage, a society has to perceive a problem when it occurs. Once having 
anticipated a phenomenon, perception can still fail because the anticipated phenomenon is not 
recognized as a problem, or the dimensions of the problem are not fully understood. There are 
several reasons for a failure of perception. 1/ The material origins of a problem can be 
imperceptible; 2/ cultural and political factors can be responsible that an objective problem is 
subjectively not perceived as such; 3/ a failure to perceive a problem may be implied in its 
temporal pattern: if it grows incrementally, bit by bit, and if these changes are concealed by 
continual fluctuations, even if there is an exponential growth during the first stages, societies 
may conceive this as “normalcy”. 
The third step is the actual solving process through collective action. Many societies 
fail at this stage, often due to conflicts of interest based on distributive effects of problem-
solving, due to incompatible problem-solving philosophies, or due to coordination problems. 
Other possible reasons are described in models on social traps and dilemmas like the 
prisoners’ dilemma or the logic of collective action. Finally, failure can also emerge from 
irrational behavior based on non-adaptive norms and values (Diamond 2005). 
Even if a society has anticipated, perceived, and communicated the problem and 
controls the relevant resources, failure is still possible because the problem can be beyond the 
solving capacities. It could simply be too expensive to solve, efforts could be “too little, too 
late”, or the solution could “disimprove” the situation. 
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Modern societies are differentiated and many heterogeneous agents and rule systems 
contribute to the problem solving process. Following the “Nerves of Government” analogy 
introduced by Deutsch, the various parts of a society are integrated in a central nervous 
system, communicating observations and perceptions between the components and 
controlling its collective behavior, which should contribute to problem-solving and adaptation 
(Deutsch 1963). But to avoid the functionalist blind alley of thinking society as super 
organism with a centralized brain, a more suitable concept is the “policy network” as outlined 
by Kenis/Schneider (1991: 24): “The core of this perspective is a decentralized concept of 
social organization and governance: society is no longer exclusively controlled by a central 
intelligence (e.g. the State); rather, controlling devices are dispersed and intelligence is 
distributed among a multiplicity of action (or "processing") units. The coordination of these 
action units is no longer the result of "central steering" (…) but emerges through the 
purposeful interactions of individual actors, who themselves are enabled for parallel action by 
exchanging information and other relevant resources” (an overview give Lang & Leifeld 
2007; Schneider, Janning, Leifeld & Malang 2009). 
 
Capacities of problem-solving: hypotheses and conjectures 
Which roles and functions do the various societal agents – government, science, the media, 
and NGOs – have in the above-mentioned stages of problem-solving? Is it possible to relate 
the varying capacities to cope with creeping problems to their structural features (e.g. 
relational patterns and resource distributions)? In the following section, we apply the policy 
network perspective and derive some hypotheses associated to varying capacities of national 
political systems when coping with this specific type of policy problems.  
Anticipation 
There are only two ways of anticipating a problem which has not yet become manifest. The 
first is to rely on introspection or a kind of supra-natural “revelation knowledge”. The other is 
predictive knowledge based on empirical evidence. Problems can frequently be anticipated 
through scientific forecasts, and science then works as an early warning system. In this 
instance, science as a cultural subsystem of society is considered to be a crucial part of the 
perceptual apparatus. However, as we will argue, scientific anticipation alone is not a decisive 
factor for an effective start to societies’ problem-solving process: it must be considered in 
conjunction with the importance a given society attributes to scientific knowledge. Even if we 
assume that science is able to predict the slowly emerging problem correctly, the early 
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anticipation of a problem will fail to become socially relevant if a society does not consider 
science to be an authoritative and credible tool for at least approximately true “knowledge-
making”.  
We can therefore conjecture that reputation and status of the national science systems 
depend on how advanced they are in scientific terms. Moreover, the higher the reputation and 
status of a national science system, the more likely it then is that problems get correctly 
anticipated because decision-makers are more likely to hear their voice. The issue, however, 
is how to measure these differences in a macro-comparative perspective. While the 
measurement of reputation is difficult in all respects, two straight measures would be the 
number of researchers in a country and expenditures for research and development. 
Perception 
Perception is the core around which cybernetic metaphors such as nerves and neurons 
gravitate. Two crucial aspects are considered: First, we analyze conditions for the scientific 
perception of a given problem. Second, we emphasize societal perception of facts and analyze 
mechanisms through which they become socially relevant. The first is primarily a scientific 
task whereas the second refers to how sensitively mass media, social movements and interest 
groups function as societal “neurotransmitters” that link a change in environmental conditions 
to a credible threat. Aside from the above-mentioned channels of interest intermediation 
transforming scientific findings into generalized knowledge, science may also be directly 
drawn into policy networks: Science may be an influential agent by producing and 
communicating relevant knowledge (Leifeld & Schneider 2010). If the network operates 
effectively, relevant information may diffuse faster among political actors, and the 
politicization of a given problem should be easier than in tightly controlled autocratic or 
hierarchical systems. Assuming that this network argument is true, we expect a government to 
be more sensitive to climate change problems when there are more possibilities of getting 
access to the political agenda via decentralized policy networks. 
This argument is also valid at the global level. In the contemporary “global society”, 
science is part of the world polity in which information exchange cannot be restricted to 
national boundaries (Drori, Meyer, Ramirez & Schofer 2003; Fisher 2003). Problem 
perception in one national science system quickly diffuses to other regions and countries, and 
this diffusion is particularly strong if countries are members of intergovernmental 
organizations such as the OECD, European Union, or specialized organizations such as the 
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IPCC. These organizations not only facilitate but also sponsor exchange and cooperation in 
scientific knowledge-making and diffusion (Beck 2010; Haas 2005). . 
Various studies have shown that countries vary greatly in the way their scientists 
perceive the problem of climate change(Bray & Krück 2001; Grundmann 2007). However, 
these differences do not fully capture the national variations in perception. The latter has to be 
related to socio-political communication by intermediaries like social movements, interest 
groups, political parties and mass media, but also to the general cultural background in which 
a given problem such as climate change emerges (Verweij et al 2006). Social movements are 
not just “problem communicators”, they also help to frame and crystallize issues, making 
them socially relevant (Moser 2007). In the case of global warming, green NGOs are of 
particular importance (Carpenter 2001; Fisher 2003; Keohane 2002). Since major impacts of 
climate change will not occur in the near future, the topic is less tangible to the public and 
various stakeholders. Green NGOs therefore have to work for a sustained problem perception. 
Compared to single issue campaigning generally associated with the approaches of NGOs to 
environmental and public risks, climate change “ushers in a new era of engagement” (Gough 
& Shackley 2001). 
It is not surprising that green social movements are closely linked with green parties. 
Since environmental problems and, in particular, global warming imply long-lasting and high-
risk problems, the emergence of green parties from social movements can be understood as a 
consolidation of this issue area. In line with our neural model, we assume that the more 
numerous and politically integrated social movements and green parties are in a given society, 
the better and more stable the societal perception of global warming will be. 
Another risk transmitter is the media. It has a crucial function as a source of 
information and opinion about scientific findings for citizens (Carvalho 2007; Weingart, 
Engels & Pansegrau 2000). Public perception of this domain is significantly influenced by the 
representation of scientific knowledge transmitted through various means of mass 
communication (Corbett & Durfee 2004; Krosnick, Holbrook & Visser 2000). In this respect 
mass media are also important for the understanding of perceived risks, and it is obvious that 
only individuals who understand the complex relation between causes and effects are willing 
to take action to impede the risk (Stamm, Clark & Eblacas 2000).  
The ways in which people think about environmental problems is not necessarily 
accurate or complete. Nevertheless, these cognitive processes are likely to influence both the 
willingness and ability of societal agents to participate in problem-solving. We consequently 
8 
 
assume that uncensored media coverage has two effects on problem perception: It transforms 
scientific perception of a problem into a general societal perception, and it also contributes to 
the understanding of the nature of the problem and thereby motivates collective action. The 
relation between these factors can be expressed in the following hypothesis: The better the 
understanding of the issue of global warming, the more likely it is that a society will take 
action to prevent the problem, and without a free press, the step from scientific perception to 
social perception is less likely. Therefore we believe that the greater the freedom of press in a 
society is, the more likely the societal perception of a creeping problem will be.  
Agenda setting 
The intermediate step between societal perception and a policy solution is the shift from the 
social to the political realm in problem-processing. A first stage in this process is the 
transformation of the issue to a topic on the priority list of a political system. Communication 
science and policy research call this process “agenda-setting” (Kingdon 2003). A jump on the 
political agenda may be triggered through communication by non-governmental actors and 
mass media. But agenda-setting may also originate from the inside of politics – the 
bureaucratic or parliamentary arena. Another powerful trigger is the environment of a political 
system, as it is emphasized in the literature on policy transfer, diffusion, and convergence 
(Holzinger & Knill 2005). 
There are several dimensions where political systems can differ with respect to the 
openness and permeability of their policy-agendas. One important factor is the access of 
social movements and NGOs to participation in policy networks. Political systems vary 
widely in terms of their degree to which they integrate new and rather weak interests (Kriesi 
1995). In this respect, it seems reasonable to assume that inclusion-prone or consensus-
oriented political systems incorporating all actors concerned in policy processes are likely to 
perform better in the political perception of societal problems (Dryzek 2009; Jost & Jacob 
2004; Scruggs 2003). While this “openness” is difficult to measure in a quantitative 
perspective, a proxy measure could be Lijphart’s index on consensus democracy (Lijphart 
1999).  
Problem-solving 
Once a problem is on the political agenda, the struggle for a policy solution is often a process 
which is driven by conflicting interests and the quest for power. Accordingly, it seems to be 
appropriate to take the institutional structures of governmental systems (in the narrow sense) 
into account. A classical political question is if the dispersion and sharing of political power 
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enhances or reduces the capacity for collective action (Norris 2008). In the political science 
literature, there are two contrasting hypotheses: 1\ Tsebelis’ veto player model states that an 
increasing number of veto players in a political system reduces its capacity to change the 
status quo by collective action (Tsebelis 2002). 2/ Lijpharts studies on democratic systems 
point to performance advantages of decentralized political systems where power is shared 
among many actors and different levels (Lijphart 1999; Wälti 2004). Power dispersion sums 
up the arrangement of executive power, party systems and electoral regimes, interest group 
structures, but also the vertical division of power in federal systems. From this perspective, 
there are two major streams of argumentation: On the one hand, it is conceivable that 
“majoritarian systems” with only one real center of power are able to produce policy solutions 
faster and more radical than consensus models. On the other hand, governments in more 
consensus-oriented democracies, which have to look at several different actor positions when 
designing a policy in a deliberative way, could be affiliated with more encompassing, mature, 
and long-term policy solutions. In such arrangements, electoral cycles and pressures have less 
impact than in majoritarian democracies, which are more short-term oriented. For instance, a 
minority party like the Greens in Germany can be considered more influential in consensus 
systems because they, at the very least, must be integrated in policy-making, whereas in 
majority systems environmental problems could be ignored. 
 
The case of climate change: Applying macro-quantitative analysis  
The previous sections sketched a theoretical framework for system analysis. We argued that 
different political and social systems structures contribute to both the varying pace and degree 
of governmental reaction in coping with long-term risks. To illustrate our point, we will now 
discuss the case of climate change and show some analytical results. After presenting our 
findings and discussing weaknesses of this approach, we conclude with a prospect to 
complementary research strategies. 
The issue of anthropogenic global warming was first hypothesized by the Swedish 
physicist and chemist Svante Arrhenius about 100 years ago. But only during the last two or 
three decades, climate change has been perceived as a pressing global risk to be tackled both 
at the national and the global level of world society. However, various countries react rather 
differently to this common challenge. We will try to test whether this variation is caused by 
political characteristics of these countries. 
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Hypotheses and Operationalizations 
Successful coping - our explanandum - is measured by two dependent variables: The first is 
the duration between the agreement on the Kyoto protocol, initially adopted on 11 December 
1997, and the date of ratification, acceptance, accession or approval of the protocol by 
countries measured in days. The second is the countries’ ratification time span of the 
‘Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer’ which was opened for 
signature on September 16, 1987. These time spans show which countries are early adopters 
and which countries are laggards. 
Our assumption is that governments are willing and able to control the level of CO2 
emissions only if they assign a high priority to this risk. Following our theoretical framework, 
we identify four different ways how the national level of risk awareness is affected. These 
four hypothesized connections and their respective operationalizations are outlined in the 
following. 
The first dimension which should have an influence on the urgency national 
governments assign to the climate change question is the level of risk-exposure of each 
country. Risk exposure can be measured by dividing the length of the coast lines of a country 
by the country’s area. Countries with a high coast/area ratio are often directly threatened by 
extreme weather conditions and especially by rising sea levels.  
The second aspect captures the effect of research and education on the national 
capacity of problem anticipation. On a very basic level, our indicators of Research & 
Development (R&D) expenditures and the number of researchers working in the R&D sector 
simply measure the quantitative importance of the scientific sector in a country, e.g. how 
much money and manpower is put into research. This leads to the hypothesis that the bigger 
the R&D share in a country, the higher the possibility that a creeping problem is anticipated. 
However, since science and research is very much a globalized undertaking, the crucial role 
of national researchers is in fact the transformation of scientific inference into public 
knowledge: It is not about which national scientific system has first discovered that there is a 
phenomenon like climate change and which problems this could spur for mankind. It is rather 
the question which national scientific system is credible in forecasting global development. 
Hence, R&D expenditures and the number of researchers also capture the qualitative 
credibility a society attributes to science in delivering expertise, and the institutionalized 
position science has in a national political system. We assume that the higher the shares of 
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these indicators, the more scientific inference is considered as a basis for societal and political 
action, hence the faster a country will anticipate the dangers of global warming.  
The possibility to obtain and publish diverse information and opinion is the third 
aspect which is hypothesized to make governments consider global warming as a pressing 
problem. The possibility to communicate societal problems is a necessary condition for public 
discourse, which we assume to increase the chances of perceiving climate change as a threat. 
We operationalize this by the number of newspapers in a country, the percentage of internet 
users and the Freedom House Index, which measures the political rights in a country, such as 
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. 
Our last dimension departs from the discourse argument but additionally considers the 
possibilities of organized collective action in a country. It is hypothesized that the better the 
legal and factual possibilities for organizing political claims, the more likely the emergence of 
organized interests concerning the mitigation of climate change. We use readily available 
measures of good governance (Kaufmann et al 1999), electoral participation (Vanhanen 
2000), and the Polity III Index as indicators of the nation states’ capacity to serve as the arena 
of extensive public discourse and the possibility of public claims to be transformed into 
political programs. We expect democratic countries to actively engage in climate protection 
policy while authoritarian countries rather shy away from becoming very active. 
Why are countries early adopters or laggards? The pace of government activity can be 
assessed by looking at the Kyoto Protocol and Montreal Protocol survival data. More 
specifically, we analyze the ratification dates as a function of our indicators presented above. 
Survival analysis, which is also known as event history analysis, is an econometric method 
which allows to analyze durations as a function of time by fitting parametric distributions 
(e.g., the exponential or the Weibull distribution), or as a function of covariates (such as risk-
exposure). In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, there is obviously no distribution that could 
reasonably well be fitted to the ratification durations because the hazard rate is bimodal. A 
survival model which is capable of estimating the effect of country-level variables on the time 
to ratification is the Cox Proportional Hazard Model. The assumption of this model, however, 
is that the hazard ratios are constant, i.e. the survival curves in the figures 12.1 and 12.2 
should not cross each other. As this is clearly not the case, the proportional hazard assumption 
is violated. In such a case, Tableman & Kim (2004: 136) propose to use a non-parametric 
survival model. Moreover, the data is right-censored because not all countries have ratified 
the protocol. We therefore use the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier approach for each covariate 
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separately and report the survival curves in figures 12.1 and 12.2 (see Efron 1988: with 
further references to survival analysis). 
What factors – besides diffusion – are responsible for early versus late adoption? We 
include several of the above-mentioned covariates in our model and estimate their effect one 
by one. The black survival rate represents the value 0 of a dummy variable, while the gray 
line is the value 1 of the same dichotomous variable. If an explanatory variable is continuous, 
we dichotomize the values at the median value.  
 
 
Figure 12.1: The Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
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Figure 12.2: The Ratification of the Montreal Protocol 
In the first plot, the level of risk-exposure is analyzed. The cost/area ratio is 
dichotomized at the median value of the distribution in order to partition countries into a 
group of strongly exposed (value 1) and less exposed countries (value 0). There is a clear 
difference in the survival rates of the two groups: After the first few ratifications of the Kyoto 
protocol, exposed countries ratify the protocols faster than less exposed countries. However, 
in this respect the Montreal data show a much the weaker effect on the pace of ratification. 
The gray and the black line are almost identical, but more risk-exposed countries are still 
consistently faster at reacting.  
Social and political explanatory factors are more interesting in the context of our 
theory. In the following graphs we test the effect of the scientific system on the ratification 
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speed. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, it is evident that nations with higher R&D 
expenditures and more research staff are faster in adopting the protocol at any time. For the 
Kyoto Protocol, we find the same pattern as for the risk exposure analysis. Since almost all 
countries of the EU exhibit high values on the two measurement items, up to the date of the 
collective European ratification, countries with lower importance of the scientific system 
adopt the protocol faster, but once the European states sign, the same pattern as in the 
Montreal analysis can be observed. Hence, countries with a strong scientific system, which 
enjoy high public and political reputation in problem anticipation, react faster to the long-term 
threat of global warming than countries where the sciences have a weaker position. 
The second line of our plots shows the variables measuring the information and 
communication infrastructures necessary for a free public debate. In the case of Kyoto, there 
is obviously a correlation between ratification pace and the number of newspapers in a 
country, the share of internet access per 1000 inhabitants, and the Freedom House Political 
Rights Index. Besides the delay due to the European coordination, nations that have the 
possibilities of a free public discourse adopt the protocols faster than countries where freedom 
of speech is restricted. The Montreal analysis draws an even clearer picture: Countries which 
enable a vivid and diverse political discourse are faster in signing agreements that are 
designed to correct dangerous societal behavior like the destruction of the ozone layer. 
The last part of the figure shows the influence of political institutions on the pace of 
treaty ratification. The Worldwide Governance Indicator (WWGI) “Voice and 
Accountability”, the Polity III index, and the Vanhanen index of democracy, all again 
dichotomized at the median value, are considered. These indices capture different aspects of 
whether a country is democratic or autocratic. For Kyoto, during the first third of the process, 
democratic (gray curve) and autocratic countries (black curve) perform identically, but then 
the democratic countries appear to have reached a certain critical mass (the joint European 
adoption). The process is then slowed down again. This pattern is strongly consistent over all 
democracy measures we have tested. The finding generally suggests that the more stable, 
participatory and effective a political system is, the more likely it is that the Kyoto protocol is 
ratified rapidly, particularly after the initial spin-off after about 1,550 days. The Montreal 
analysis confirms the Kyoto result. Here, democracies are faster in signing the protocol 
throughout the whole period. Apparently, not only the free communication of political views 
is of significance for the perception of a long-term problem; it also takes free democratic 
systems for the transformation of political views into political programs and political action. 
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Our analysis shows that democracies perform better – which means faster in our case – in 
responding with political claims to newly perceived incremental problems (for this 
observation see also Bättig & Bernauer 2009). The possibility of political mobilization is 
supportive for the translation of perceived societal problems into political outputs. 
The analysis has provided some clues of how political systems cope with long-term 
risks. Important factors promoting governmental activity seem to be a high extent of the 
problem for the country at risk, an important role of the scientific system for the credible 
anticipation of the problem, free and diverse channels of information distribution and 
communication for perceiving the problem and debating in the public, as well as a democratic 
and open political system that allows collective action on emerging societal problems. Note, 
however, that these findings are merely correlations, and we do not know in how far each 
effect is persistent if all other proposed variables are held constant.  
Limits and Drawbacks  
A general problem in this analysis, however, is that the independent variables not only explain 
the dependent variables, but also explain each other (i.e. multicollinearity). In this respect it is 
difficult to differentiate between democracy and economy. Supporting the famous Lipset 
hypothesis (Lipset 1959), recent studies have shown that democracy and economic 
development are closely related (Norris 2008; Przeworski 2000). In the cross-sectional 
analysis above, a separate model was therefore estimated for every indicator, showing that a 
democratic and economic effect is indeed at work. 
A further limitation is associated with the independence of cases problem. In 
inferential statistics, observations are assumed to be independent from each other. Not only in 
the context of globalization, such independence between political systems is highly doubtable. 
Great powers have the ability to create and enforce international norms. Globalization and 
Europeanization make this even more problematic, since inter- and supranational 
organizations can harmonize policies by collective decision mechanisms. In this context, 
developed countries offer other countries development assistance and expect their compliance 
in the international arena (e.g. the “adaptation fund” initiated at the Bali summit or the “forest 
carbon partnership” offered by the German government and the World Bank). Russia’s 
ratification of the Kyoto protocol in November 2004 was tied to the issue of Russian WTO 
accession as a package deal. Once such incentives are offered to less wealthy and less 
democratic countries, the variance between countries cannot be reliably explained anymore on 
the grounds of democratic and economic mechanisms in a simple cross-sectional design. It 
16 
 
might be possible to solve this problem of autocorrelation, which is also known as Galton’s 
problem, by identifying and incorporating the underlying mechanisms of diffusion (Jahn 
2006).  
Another type of problem is related to the operationalization of some variables: even 
when we are able to measure outputs or reaction speed as a form of “policy commitment”, the 
varying effectiveness of policy instruments (e.g. emission trading) is not taken into account. 
As for the independent variables, we cannot ascertain whether GDP per capita, for instance, 
has an effect on voters’ values, i.e. post-materialism, and on the possibility to assert these 
values in a participatory political system (since democracy and wealth are correlated), or 
whether it is just a proxy for development, i.e. fewer competing societal risks promote a 
higher priority of climate change in governmental policy-making. This leads to the 
multicollinearity issue again, which in the last instance is a theoretical rather than a 
methodological problem.  
A final difficulty is that countries are exposed to a variety of simultaneous challenges. 
Some of these have a global scope like environmental issues, and some do not or hardly 
exceed state boundaries, e.g. civil wars, economic decline or demographic change. The role of 
these competing risks in causing governments to act has largely been neglected. Governments 
face tradeoffs when anticipating and fighting risks, i.e. they will only see the most pressing 
problems and neglect others(Jones & Baumgartner 2005). If a government has to suppress 
upcoming ethnic tensions, for instance, it will assign a very low priority to climate change, 
given the time, staff and budget constraint. Climate change is only one of these risks. If one 
tries to infer more abstract mechanisms from this single case, one might face an extreme 
small-n problem. In other words, we cannot be sure that our theory and our findings equally 
apply to other creeping catastrophes.  
 
Conclusion 
Better data and more advanced methods undoubtedly lead to advancements in the social 
sciences to explain why some institutional structures produce better results or why some 
policy instruments have a better effect. Macro-quantitative analysis in our context supposes 
that we are able to find “quasi laws” in societies of the kind “an increment of x in democracy 
leads to an increment of y in reaction time”. The problem is first, that this macro-relationship 
is intermediated by so many additional variables inside the black box of national political 
systems. From a pure macro perspective, one can only guess some internal mechanisms, such 
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as: wealthy voters have post-materialist attitudes and promote green policy, or wealthy 
countries usually have fewer competing societal risks and can prioritize less urgent matters 
like climate change, etc. The second problem is that countries at the same democracy level 
might have quite different party systems, interest group structures, and various ways of 
integrating science and social movements in policy formulation. With respect to the 
assumption that countries are homogeneous, there might actually be big differences between 
policy sectors. This was emphasized already in the debate on meso-corporatism in the late 
80s. A recent study shows that findings in one sector can be very different from findings in 
another sector (Grote, Lang & Schneider 2008). 
In this respect it might be hasty to transfer macro-quantitative findings on general 
environmental policy to the climate change policy domain (cf. Dryzek 2009), since the issue 
at stake, actor constellations and communication structures between major components of the 
political system are quite diverse. For this reason, we argue that qualitative or quantitative 
case studies can provide more accurate insights into domestic processes and lead to a better 
qualitative foundation of the mechanisms. Macro-quantitative studies should be triangulated 
with meso-level studies using “nested analysis” (Lieberman 2005): After conducting a 
preliminary large-n analysis, one should go down to the level of “on- and off-the-line” 
individual cases, refine the model, develop implications and then test them again on the macro 
level in a large-n analysis.  
Such case studies may concentrate on some of the following aspects, which cannot be 
included in a pure macro-comparative analysis. 1\ What role does policy coordination 
between the countries play from the perspective of national states? 2\What is the role of 
specific institutions like the parliament, the executive government, direct participation of the 
electorate, or the integration of scientific consulting, social movements, interest groups and 
the media in agenda-setting and policy-making? 3\ How does the public discourse about risk 
evolve, and what organizations have an interest in promoting a given position? Can this be 
aggregated to an across-country pattern? 4\What different interest or discourse configurations 
can we identify in the countries? Policy network analysis might be a valuable tool for the 
investigation of this question. Do certain configurations or the intensity of cleavage lines 
affect the policy outcome if compared on a macro scale? 
Many of these questions can be answered by analyzing the actor constellations and 
networks in the formulation and implementation of these policies (Schneider, Janning, Leifeld 
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& Malang 2009). Although this method is increasingly used in policy analysis, its analytical 
power is still not fully taped.
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Table 12.1: Description of Data and Sources 
Variable Variabl
e code 
Description Unit and value 
range 
Source 
Dependent variables     
Montreal Protocol 
ratification dates 
  days; from 16 
September 1987 to 
01 May 2010 
 
http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification
_status/ 
Kyoto Protocol ratification 
dates 
  days; from 11 
December 1997 to 
01 May 2010 
 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/st
atus_of_ratification/items/2613.ph
p 
Independent variables     
Freedom House Index FHI Freedom house Index of political rights 
and civil liberties 
+1 to +7 http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
Polity III index Polity Polity III Index; always the latest polity 
ending in 1994 
-88 to +10 http://www.systemicpeace.org/pol
ity/ 
Failed States Index Failed 
S. 
Failed States Index 2007 +17.1 to +113.7 http://www.fundforpeace.org/ 
Vanhanen Index: Electoral 
Participation 
VH 
Part. 
the Vanhanen Index of electoral 
participation 2000 
+2.27 to +70.16 http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datase
ts/Governance/Vanhanens-index-
of-democracy/ 
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World Wide Governance 
Indicators: Government 
effectiveness 
WWGI 
GE 
World Bank: World Wide Governance 
Indicators 2007; government effectiveness 
in 2006 
-2.19 to + 2.29 http://info.worldbank.org/governa
nce/wgi/ 
World Wide Governance 
Indicators: Regulatory 
quality 
WWGI 
RQ 
World Bank: World Wide Governance 
Indicators 2007; regulatory quality in 2006 
-2.70 to + 1.95 http://info.worldbank.org/governa
nce/wgi/ 
World Development 
Indicators 
WDI Number of internet users per 100 
inhabitants; number of daily newspapers 
per 1,000 people; number of researchers in 
R&D per million inhabitants; R&D 
expenditure (% GDP;  
Energy use: change 
from 1996 to 2005. 
Other variables: 
mean value 1996-
2005 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog 
Coast/area ratio  Total length of the boundary between the 
land area (including islands) and the sea in 
km, divided by the sum of all land and 
water areas delimited by international 
boundaries and/or coastlines in square km 
0 to +8.71 https://www.cia.gov/library/public
ations/the-world-
factbook/fields/2060.html 
https://www.cia.gov/library/public
ations/the-world-
factbook/fields/2147.html 
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